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This article draws a parallel between nuclear weapons and the next generation of military 
technology, autonomous systems. It outlines some legal and ethical dilemmas the latter pose, and 
in particular aspects of the technology that make it dehumanizing. Autonomous systems share all 
of these attributes with nuclear weapons. This fact should be encouraging, because the 
dehumanizing effects of nuclear systems have been overcome. Drawing on the evolution of nuclear 
strategy and the nuclear taboo, I argue that, in negotiating the legal and ethical dilemmas posed 
by autonomous weapons systems, the role of international law and of normative entrepreneurs will 
be primarily one of imagination, not regulation. The first and most important task is to create 
focal points in popular and elite consciousness. To this end, I make three modest suggestions for 
normative entrepreneurs: to take political incentives seriously, including the impossibility of 
abolition or non-use; to first establish simple, guiding ideas accessible to a broad population before 
turning to finer points of law; and to focus on interstate, rather than transnational, cooperation. 
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I.  AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS AND DEHUMANIZED VIOLENCE 
The central ethical problem of autonomous weapons is 
dehumanized violence. The threats they present to innocent lives, the 
gaps they interpose between decisionmakers and actual violence, and 
the cold rationality of their deployment, are all moral dilemmas on a 
scale militaries have rarely seen. So pronounced is this problem, that 
some scholars and public intellectuals have advocated for the total 
abolition of these weapons. 
Autonomous systems are a product of modern technology, yet 
the focus on their strangeness or novelty obscures the most important 
part of the problem they present: we have faced it before. Nuclear 
weapons and nuclear strategy share all the problems that make 
autonomous systems dehumanizing. In fact, they confronted modern 
societies with the same problems on an even greater scale. 
Encouragingly, these problems were, by and large, overcome. 
If the history of nuclear strategy is any guide, the problem of 
dehumanization will not be met by changing the weapons themselves, 
nor through their abolition. Technology is not the answer. Instead, the 
re-humanization of autonomous systems will come through 
imagination. Through devices like narrative journalism, speculative 
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fiction, and public awareness campaigns, normative and legal 
entrepreneurs can restore a human dimension to their moral calculus 
without undercutting the strategic logic necessary for their successful 
use. This approach has clear precedent in international law and 
cooperation. It is essentially a solution of imagination. 
The history of nuclear strategy teaches a second lesson: the role 
of imagination must proceed from, and not replace, the same 
rationality, distance, and abstraction that dehumanized violence in the 
first place. Put another way, the dehumanizing aspects of autonomous 
systems are inescapable. Humanity is retained (or restored) to these 
systems, not by doing away with their dehumanizing character, but by 
pairing it with something more. 
Both lessons derive from the application of game theory to 
human conflict. Before developing these lessons, though, this article 
first reviews the reasons scholars, philosophers, policymakers, and 
journalists are worried by autonomous weapons. 
A. How Autonomous Systems Dehumanize Violence 
Dehumanized violence is a particularly common problem in 
the modern world. In a famous passage, Hannah Arendt captures its 
danger while describing the trial of Adolf Eichmann, a Nazi officer in 
the SS: 
Eichmann was not Iago and not Macbeth . . . Except 
for an extraordinary diligence in looking out for his 
personal advancement, he had no motives at all . . . He 
merely, to put the matter colloquially, never realized 
what he was doing . . . such remoteness from reality 
and such thoughtlessness can wreak more havoc than 
all the evil instincts taken together which, perhaps, are 
inherent in man.1 
                                                 
 1 HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE 
BANALITY OF EVIL (1963). 
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The problem, Arendt relates, was not that Eichmann thought 
of others as monsters, but that he did not think of them at all. His 
world, and his victims, had been thoroughly dehumanized. 
1. Civilian Casualties 
At least four qualities of autonomous systems, when used in 
war, tend to dehumanize their violence: harm to noncombatants; 
distance from actual killing; abstraction of human targets; and 
automation of life-and-death decisions. The most common critique of 
autonomous weapons, especially drones, focuses on civilian casualties. 
Autonomous weapons’ role in noncombatant deaths in Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, and especially Yemen attract significant controversy, and 
non-profit groups expend substantial resources drawing attention to 
the cost in innocent lives. A small minority of scholars have even 
argued that, because of their harm to noncombatants, manufacturing 
drones is unethical and tantamount to abetting murder.2 
When tallying drones’ civilian toll, some think tanks, such as 
the New America Foundation, have set the number of non-militant deaths 
quite high, between 747 and 1076;3Other organizations, such as the 
Bureau for Investigative Journalism, put the figures even higher,4 but 
official figures are much lower.5 Ultimately, the opacity with which the 
United States conducts these overseas operations make reliable figures 
difficult to cite with any degree of certainty. 
                                                 
 2 Edmund F. Byrne, Making Drones to Kill Civilians: Is It Ethical?, 147 J. of Bus. 
Ethics 81, 81-93 (2018). 
 3 NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION, AMERICA’S COUNTERTERRORISM WARS: 
TRACKING THE UNITED STATES DRONE STRIKES AND OTHER OPERATIONS IN 
PAKISTAN, YEMEN, AND SOMALIA (June 2019), https://www.newamerica.org/in-
depth/americas-counterterrorism-wars/. 
 4 THE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM, DRONE WARFARE (June 
2019), https://www.thebureauinvestig ates.com/projects/drone-war. 
 5 OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, SUMMARY OF 
2016 INFORMATION REGARDING UNITED STATES COUNTERTERRORISM STRIKES 
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Still, there is substantial evidence that drones do not kill civilians 
at disproportionate rates from similar weapons.6 Indeed, the rapid 
technological advance of these systems has rendered them less 
dangerous to innocent lives than more traditional forms of air power. 
Nonetheless, because autonomous systems tend to be low-cost, they 
could still increase civilian casualties by making decisionmakers more 
willing to take violent action.7 Whatever their effects on individual 
encounters, it does seem certain that, by decreasing the costs of 
engagements, autonomous weapons increase the utility of violent 
force, and thus the likelihood policymakers use it. 
2. Distance 
Second, autonomous systems often place humans at a 
significant distance from actual killing. This distance can make it 
difficult for remote pilots (or for the machines themselves) to 
distinguish combatants from non-combatants.8 Consequently, some 
philosophers and legal theorists have argued for deliberately reducing 
this distance, even if that means endangering one’s own soldiers.9 As 
well, the relative safety of one side can blur the moral distinction 
between warfare and policing. If soldiers are not at risk, are they really 
soldiers anymore?10 Less obviously, but no less dangerously, this 
distance can make human decisionmakers less aware of others’ 
humanity. Removed from the circumstances of a decision, 
decisionmakers may not fully recognize or appreciate the decision’s 
imperatives. This distance can weaken human agents’ ability to employ 
moral reasoning or even undermine their sense of responsibility.11 
                                                 
 6 Vivek Sehrawat, Legal Status of Drones Under LOAC and International Law, 5 
PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 164, 168-70 (2017). 
 7 The Constitutional and Counterterrorism Implications of Targeted Killing: Hearing 
Before the S. Judiciary Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Human Rights, 113th 
Cong. 12-14 (2013) (statement of Prof. Rosa Brooks). 
 8 ALEX J. BELLAMY, JUST WARS: FROM CICERO TO IRAQ 182 (2006). 
 9 MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH 
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 156 (2015). 
 10 Paul W. Kahn, War and Sacrifice in Kosovo, 19 PHIL. AND PUB. POL’Y 1, 2 
(1999). 
 11 P. M. Asaro, Remote-Control Crimes, 18 IEEE ROBOTICS AUTOMATION 
MAG. 68, 68-69 (2011). 
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As above, it is not clear that the distance autonomous systems 
create between human operators and military targets actually imperils 
civilians, at least not any more than similar weapons. In theory, drones 
and related technology can actually create much more accurate 
depictions of military targets than traditional artillery or manned 
bombers,12 though whether practice lives up to this potential is unclear. 
Yet even if it does, the moral distance still exists. At root, the 
dehumanizing power of distance stems from its impairment of moral 
intuition, and this seems inherent in the technology. 
3. Abstraction 
Similar to distance, autonomous systems make human targets 
abstract. At best, the human image may be filtered through screens; at 
worst, it is never observed at all. Popular-press articles often translate 
this by saying war becomes “like a video game,”13 but the problem does 
not need to be so stylized.14 By removing the human face, or by 
encountering the human image in a virtual or other strange 
environment,15 abstracting from actual human beings increases an 
                                                 
 12 Christian Enemark, Unmanned Drones and the Ethics of War, in ROUTLEDGE 
HANDBOOK OF ETHICS AND WAR: JUST WAR IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 332 
(Nicholas G. Evans, Fritz Allhof, and Adam Henscke eds., 2013). 
 13 Noah Shachtman, Drone School: A Ground’s-Eye View, WIRED MAG. (May 
27, 2005), https://www.wired.com/2005/05/drone-school-a-grounds-eye-view/; 
Chris Cole, Mary Dobbing, and Amy Hallwood, Convenient Killing: Armed Drones and 
the ‘Playstation’ Mentality (Sept. 2010), 
https://dronewarsuk.files.wordpress.com/2010/10/conv-killing-final.pdf. 
 14 In fact, some journalists have challenged this idea, arguing that drone 
pilots experience more graphic violence than other soldiers. Eyal Press, The Wounds of 
the Drone Warrior, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/13/magazine/veterans-ptsd-drone-warrior-
wounds.html; Sarah McCammon, The Warfare May Be Remote But the Trauma is Real, 
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Apr. 24, 2017, 2:40 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/2017/04/24/525413427/for-drone-pilots-warfare-may-be-
remote-but-the-trauma-is-real. 
 15 A related point is developed in the controversial book Barbed Wire, which 
argues the widespread use of barbed wire before WWII helped Nazi concentration 
camps see their victims as “mere biological objects.” Reviel Netz, Barbed Wire: An 
Ecology of Modernity 153 (2004). 
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individual’s willingness to commit violence and impairs their moral 
judgment.16 
From the perspective of Christian ethics, this tendency is 
particularly troubling. A human being can recognize another’s dignity 
because he can recognize the image of God.17The more abstractly he 
sees another human being, the less he perceives this image, and so the 
less he perceives another’s inherent worth.18 
In addition to soldiers, this abstraction afflicts the wider public. 
It can make war more likely: “People are more likely to support the use 
of force as long as they view it as costless.”19 It can also incur unseen 
strategic costs, especially if its victims respond against their 
dehumanization.20 The dehumanization of targets can foment 
terrorism, instability, and general animosity—in short, autonomous 
systems can create as many enemies as they kill. Indeed, the abstract, 
dehumanizing effects on the public may be the most important costs 
of all. Scholars have repeatedly shown that the experience of war 
disinclines a decisionmaker from using any kind of force.21 The most 
                                                 
 16 ”By removing warriors completely from risk and fear, unmanned systems 
create the first complete break in the ancient connection that defines warriors and 
their soldierly values . . . toward ‘virtueless war,’ a result of remote soldiers’ no longer 
having any ‘emotional connectivity with the battlespace.”‘ Peter Warren Singer, 
Wired For War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century 332 (2009). 
 17 David H. Calhoun, Human Exceptionalism and the Imago Dei, in HUMAN 
DIGNITY IN BIOETHICS: FROM WORLDVIEWS TO THE PUBLIC SQUARE 20 (Stephen 
Dilley and Nathan J. Palpant eds. 2013). 
 18 Perversely, at the same time that human operators are less perceptive of 
another’s person, the machine itself may be hyper-personalized. Charles J. Dunlap, 
Jr., The Hyper-Personalization of War: Cyber, Big Data, and the Changing Face of Conflict, 15 
GEO. J. OF INT’L AFF. 108, 112-13 (2014). 
 19 Singer, supra note 17, at 316; Stephan Sonnenberg, Why Drones Are 
Different, in PREVENTIVE FORCE: DRONES, TARGETED KILLING, AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF WARFARE 123-29 (Kerstin Fisk and Jennifer M. Ramos eds. 
2016). 
 20 Michael J. Boyle, The Costs and Consequences of Drone Warfare, 89 INT’L AFF. 
1, 14-16 (2013). 
 21 . “It may surprise some, but those in the armed forces-especially those 
who have seen the horrific consequences of war firsthand-are often the ones most 
opposed to the use of force.” Charles Dunlap, Jr., Clever or Clueless? Observations About 
Bombing Norm Debates, in THE AMERICAN WAY OF BOMBING: CHANGING ETHICAL 
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dangerous dehumanization, then, might be occurring in the minds of 
a public that never sees, hears, or reads about violence inflicted by 
autonomous weapons—a trend exacerbated by the growing 
disconnect between soldiers and citizens.22 
4. Automation 
Finally, by definition autonomous systems remove decisions 
from human control. Indeed, it seems likely, even inevitable, that 
future systems will leave computers with the final decision to use lethal 
force. The increasing speed at which autonomous military instruments 
need to make decisions will compel greater and greater leeway given to 
machines. Yet even before that bridge is crossed, autonomous systems 
pose an important question: who is responsible for their decisions? 
In terms of both international law and just war theory, some 
scholars fear that autonomous weapons, especially ones making life-
and-death decisions, will force a retreat from jus in bello (justice during 
war) to jus ad bellum (justice in going to war) when evaluating the justice 
or injustice of a past action.23 The former encompasses the evolution 
of norms and laws to govern which actions soldiers can (and cannot) 
take during armed conflict; the latter only describes those 
circumstances in which an actor may legitimately go to war. For many 
reasons dangerous, this retreat from jus in bello to jus ad bello would be 
especially troubling because the legal and ethical protections of 
noncombatants flow primarily through the former, not the latter. In 
short, the fear is that autonomous systems will push legal and ethical 
norms towards a laissez-faire approach in which the primary criterion 
for just warfare is simply whether the war was begun for a just reason. 
                                                 
AND LEGAL NORMS, FROM FLYING FORTRESSES TO DRONES 126 (Matthew A. 
Evangelista and Henry Shue eds. 2014). Beyond anecdote, this finding is robustly 
confirmed by, for instance, Michael C. Horowitz and Allan C. Stam, How Prior 
Military Experience Influences the Future Militarized Behavior of Leaders, 68 INT’L ORGS. 
527, 527-59 (2014). 
 22 WARRIORS AND CITIZENS: AMERICAN VIEWS OF OUR MILITARY 1-5 (Jim 
Mattis and Kori Schake eds. 2016). 
 23 Heather M. Roff, Killing in War, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF ETHICS 
AND WAR: JUST WAR THEORY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 353 (Nicholas G. 
Evans, Fritz Allhoff, and Adam Henschke eds. 2013). 
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B. Comparing Nuclear and Autonomous Weapons 
In some ways, humans have encountered these problems since 
ancient times. Distance inheres in any sort of ranged weapon, as does 
abstraction; crude traps and urban sieges involve a form of automatic 
death; and civilian casualties are as old as war. Perhaps the inventor of 
the sling and stone wrestled with the same moral quandaries we are 
debating now.24 Yet autonomous systems, especially drones, seem to 
take the problem a step further. While the difference may be one of 
degree, not of kind, it is still enormous. 
But there is another field where these problems loomed even 
larger: nuclear strategy. Nuclear weapons are distant: intercontinental 
ballistic missiles (ICBMs) long predate the first drone pilots operating 
behind air-conditioned desks in Nevada. Civilian casualties remained 
an inescapable part of nuclear weaponry from its inception. However 
deadly autonomous systems become, and however remotely 
controlled, they will never rival the intercontinental extinction of 
unarmed millions. 
Still more similar is the way violence becomes automatic. 
Nuclear strategists considered automatic responses a feature, not a 
bug. Policymakers sought “trip-wires”25 that would automatically 
commit them to military, even nuclear, responses.26 They coined new 
jargon to describe this desired attribute: automaticity.27 In nuclear 
bargaining, a leader who could credibly surrender his freedom of 
choice gained enormous leverage, because a nuclear system that would 
                                                 
 24 Medieval longbowmen “need have no sense of initiating an act of killing, 
therefore; it was probably their technical and professional sense which was most 
actively engaged.” JOHN KEEGAN, THE FACE OF BATTLE: A STUDY OF 
AGINCOURT, WATERLOO, AND THE SOMME 93 (1976). 
 25 THOMAS C. SCHELLING, ARMS AND INFLUENCE 47 (1966). 
 26 American policy still relies on trip-wires today. For a recent study on their 
continued role, see A. Lanoszka and M.A. Hunzeker, Landpower and American 
Credibility, 45 PARAMETERS: THE U. S. ARMY’S SENIOR PROF. J. 17, 17-26 (2016). 
 27 See Schelling, supra note 26, at 50 n. 9. 
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respond automatically to an enemy’s aggression was the strongest 
possible deterrent.28 
Perhaps most of all, nuclear strategy was dehumanized because 
of its abstraction. Except for the bombings of Japan, potential civilian 
deaths from nuclear weapons were and remain hypothetical. Anodyne 
words like “counter-value” concealed strategies that targeted 
noncombatants in the millions. And the whole subject was studied by 
economists and civilian strategists, often with mathematical tools that 
reduced human beings to numbers on a chalkboard. 
Because we have encountered the same problems before, and 
on a much more frightening scale, it will be instructive to examine how 
we solved them in the past. While they may not translate precisely, 
these solutions, one hopes, can help us navigate the coming era of 
remote-controlled warfare and “killer robots.” 
II. GAME THEORY, NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND DEHUMANIZED 
VIOLENCE 
The novelty of nuclear weapons demanded a new kind of 
military strategy. Bernard Brodie, a military thinker later celebrated for 
his commentary on Clausewitz, became the first to theorize the bomb 
in The Absolute Weapon.29 A bevy of academics soon joined him; they 
became known as “defense intellectuals.” As these strategists gained 
prominence among policymakers and in the public eye, they came 
under increasing fire. Their critics, aghast at their willingness to debate 
                                                 
 28 Thomas C. Schelling, An Essay on Bargaining, 46 THE AM. ECON. REV. 
281, 281-306 (1956). This ideal was famously satirized in Stanley Kubrick’s Dr. 
Strangelove, which imagined a Soviet weapon, the Doomsday Machine, that would 
automatically destroy the entire world if any atomic device were detonated. DR. 
STRANGELOVE, OR, HOW I LEARNED TO STOP WORRYING AND LOVE THE BOMB 
(Columbia TriStar Home Entertainment 1964). See also Charles Maland, Dr. 
Strangelove (1964): Nightmare Comedy and the Ideology of Liberal Consensus, 31 AM. Q. 697, 
697-717 (1979); PETER DANIEL SMITH, DOOMSDAY MEN: THE REAL DR. 
STRANGELOVE AND THE DREAM OF THE SUPERWEAPON (2007). 
 29 BERNARD BRODIE ET AL., THE ABSOLUTE WEAPON: ATOMIC POWER 
AND WORLD ORDER (1964); BERNARD BRODIE, STRATEGY IN THE MISSILE AGE 
(1959). 
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the pros and cons of mass death, recoiled in horror. Herman Kahn, 
whose manner and appearance could give the impression of an almost 
gleefully cynical detachment, attracted the most ire, but all experienced 
a similar opprobrium.30 Academics and peace activists condemned the 
cool, abstract way these civilian intellectuals tallied human casualties. 
Detached analysis, argued academics and activists, was no way to study 
the prospect of nuclear annihilation. 
A microcosm of this conflict is that between Thomas Schelling 
and Anatol Rapaport. Their disagreement is especially telling, since 
they focused on the most abstract and dehumanized of all the nuclear 
strategist’s tools: game theory. In particular, they disagreed about 
whether this mathematical tool, in which both were experts, should be 
applied to nuclear strategy. 
A. Should Nuclear Strategy Use Game Theory? 
Game theory uses formal, mathematical logic to study 
problems of strategic interaction. It typically assumes some sort of 
rationality among actors. As a subfield of the larger rational-choice 
tradition, game theory’s picture of the world is a limited one, but its 
practitioners hope (they place a “methodological bet”)31 that what it 
ignores will be less important than what it reveals. 
In the 1950s and 1960s, game theory achieved prominence for 
its applications to nuclear bargaining. Thomas Schelling, who went on 
to win the Nobel Prize, exemplified this approach. A Harvard 
economist, Schelling began his career working on foreign aid (he 
helped administer the Marshall Plan), and his exposure to international 
politics quickly led him to the study of nuclear strategy. In major 
                                                 
 30 Kahn’s influence and demeanor can still repel strategic thinkers (Andrew 
Bacevich calls him “creepy” in the popular press). One scholarly monograph made 
this judgment on his Thermonuclear War: it “is a massive window into a warped mind.” 
Andrew Bacevich, Rationalizing Lunacy: The Intellectual as Servant of the State, Huffington 
Post (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/rationalizing-
lunacy_b_6828460; David A. Baldwin, Andrew J. Bacevich, ed., The Long War: A New 
History of U.S. National Security Policy Since World War II, 10 J. of Cold War Stud. 149, 
149-151 (2008). 
 31 DAVID A. LAKE AND ROBERT POWELL, STRATEGIC CHOICE AND 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 16 (1999). 
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contributions to the budding field, he showed how the logic of nuclear 
bargaining did not differ substantially from that of mafia protection 
rackets; he elaborated the idea of commitment devices (like trip-wires) 
to stabilize international politics between the superpowers; and he 
analyzed “salami tactics” and explained how the United States could 
prevent their abuse. Perhaps most importantly, Schelling was the first 
strategist to recognize and explain how nuclear weapons could increase 
American bargaining leverage even when the States could not credibly 
threaten to use them. By engaging in a “competition in risk-taking,” 
the United States could compel an adversary to back down by 
increasing the risk of mutual disaster—even though neither side 
actually wanted the disaster to happen.32 Schelling articulated all of 
these ideas in readable, analytic prose, feeling as free to discuss mass 
death as coercive parenting strategies. A famous quip epitomizes this 
style: “Against defenseless people there is not much that nuclear 
weapons can do that cannot be done with an ice pick.”33 
Schelling’s cold approach met with heated criticism. Anatol 
Rapaport, himself a game theorist,34 denounced Schelling for applying 
math to nuclear strategy. Rapaport felt that, as a tool, game theory 
should be applied only with great caution to human behavior, and 
never to the Cold War arms race. He pointed out that, as a branch of 
mathematics, game theory necessarily dehumanized its subjects.35 
Between strategy and conscience, there is an “essential 
incompatibility,” he argued: 
Seduction lurks also in the mental habit of rational 
analysis. For this analysis requires detachment. While 
detachment is a source of supreme strength in the 
investigation of nature, it may be debilitating if it is 
                                                 
 32 Schelling, supra note 26, at 91. 
 33 Id. at 19. 
 34 Rapaport is perhaps most famous for his victories in Robert Axelrod’s 
“tournaments,” which pitted competitors’ strategies against each other in repeated 
Prisoner’s Dilemmas. Rapaport won with the simple strategy of tit-for-tat. ROBERT 
AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 42 (1984). 
 35 ”Mathematics is a great leveler. When a problem is mathematically 
formulated, its content has disappeared and only the form has remained. To the 
strategists ‘targets’ are indeed only circles on maps; overkill is a coefficient.” ANATOL 
RAPAPORT, STRATEGY AND CONSCIENCE 192 (1964). 
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carried over bodily from natural science . . . One 
cannot play chess if one becomes aware of the pieces 
as living souls.36 
In a review of Rapaport’s book, Schelling objected to this line 
of reasoning which alleged “strategic thinking is bad no matter how 
good it is.”37 He criticized Rapaport for disagreeing, not with his logic, 
but with its coldness. In a matter as cataclysmic as nuclear armageddon, 
cool heads would seem to be in demand. Nonetheless, Schelling 
recognized that his disagreement with Rapaport was a normative one, 
not a scientific one, and he left it to others to decide who was right. 
By any measure, Rapaport and figures like him lost the debate 
about game theory and nuclear strategy. Schelling remains the classic 
text on the subject, assigned in policy schools around the country, 
while Rapaport’s objections have passed out of print. One scholar 
wrote that Schelling “has contributed as much as and perhaps more 
than any other thinker of the scientific genre to the theory of 
international relations.”38 It is no overstatement to say that Schelling 
gave strategists and policymakers the intellectual framework they still 
use today to think about nuclear weapons.39 
Perhaps the best explanation for Schelling’s victory comes 
from Hedley Bull. Bull was an acerbic critic of modern social science, 
and his works came to found the so-called English School of 
international relations against the American combination of 
positivism, mathematics, and hypothesis-testing. Yet, despite his 
antipathy for applying science to human beings, Bull nonetheless sided 
with the defense intellectuals against Rapaport. He observed, “[there 
are] certain conflicts in the world that simply have to be taken as 
                                                 
 36 Id. at 109, 195. 
 37 Thomas C. Schelling, Book Review, 54 THE AM. ECON. REV. 1082, 1088 
(1964) (reviewing ANATOL RAPAPORT, STRATEGY AND CONSCIENCE (1964)). 
 38 Hedley Bull, International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach, 18 WORLD 
POL. 361, 368 (1966). 
 39 Robert Ayson, Thomas Schelling and the Nuclear Age: Strategy as Social 
Science (2004). The only full-length treatment of Schelling, his thought, and its 
influence. While unfairly critical in places, and overly obsessive with the concept of 
stability throughout, it is a helpful companion to Schelling’s corpus. 
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given,”40 and he faulted Rapaport for never showing where a less 
rational, more “conscientious” approach to nuclear strategy produced 
better outcomes.41 Whatever the objections to applying mathematics to 
human beings, analytic detachment is not one of them. Bull concluded: 
When one asks oneself what the history of strategic 
policy in the West might have been in the last ten years 
had this influence not been brought to bear, or when 
one contemplates the moral and intellectual poverty of 
the debate about nuclear affairs (or of that part of it we 
are able to see) in the Soviet Union where in fact no 
such influence exists, it is difficult to escape the 
conclusion that even though the civilian strategists 
have sometimes committed the errors I have been 
exploring, they have served us well.42 
Rapaport claimed that strategists cannot play chess with living 
souls. And yet, of course, they do. Strategists do because they must.43 
He was right that abstract analysis was dehumanizing, in the same way 
that autonomous systems are dehumanizing today. Yet he was wrong 
to see this objection as final. The answer to the question, “is 
abstraction dehumanizing,” must be an unequivocal yes. But that 
answer does not imply it should not be done. A lesson emerges from 
the history of nuclear strategy: when the stakes are high, rational 
                                                 
 40 Hedley Bull, Strategic Studies and Its Critics, 20 World Pol. 593, 604 (1968). 
 
 41 As another reviewer pointed out, “Ideologies are sometimes filled out with 
a complement of new and liberating conceptions, but rarely by ‘ideological 
disarmament.”‘ Arthur Lee Burns, Must Strategy and Conscience Be Disjoined?, 17 World 
Pol. 687, 688 (1965) (reviewing Anatol Rapaport, Strategy and Conscience (1964)). 
 42 Bull, supra note 41, at 605 
 43 Kahn opens the first chapter of Thinking About the Unthinkable with this 
observation: Seventy-five years ago white slavery was rampant in England. Each year 
thousands of young girls were forced into brothels and kept there against their will 
. . . One reason why this lasted as long as it did was that it could not be talked about 
openly in Victorian England; moral standards as to subjects of discussion made it 
difficult to arouse the community to necessary action.” HERMAN KAHN, THINKING 
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analysis—no matter how cold and detached—ought not and will not 
be discarded. 
Raymond Aron, in his introduction to Kahn’s Thinking About 
the Unthinkable, summarizes the issue well. He writes: 
The analyst who calculates in millions or tens of 
millions of deaths resulting in a matter of a few minutes 
or a few hours resulting from thermonuclear 
exchanges does indeed forget the human significance 
of these figures . . . without the ability to neutralize his 
feelings, the analyst’s profession would become 
impossible. But the acquired capacity to coldly examine 
possible horrors does not prove the analyst has lost his 
humanity.44 
Aron is correct, yet he leaves the most important question 
unanswered. If calculating in the abstract millions is dehumanizing, but 
the analyst has not lost his humanity, then what rehumanized the 
process? The answer to this question also arises from game theory: by 
navigating multiple equilibria with the moral imagination. 
B. The Problem of Multiple Equilibria 
According to Harrison Wagner, there are two fundamental 
insights of game theory. First is the problem of strategic 
interdependence, i.e. that one actor’s interests depend on other actors’ 
choices. Second is the problem of multiple equilibria, i.e. that many 
different outcomes are rationally possible.45 
Consider an example. Scholars of international politics often 
discuss a simple game called a Stag Hunt.46 In this game, two hunters 
                                                 
 44 Raymond Aron, Introduction to HERMAN KAHN, THINKING ABOUT THE 
UNTHINKABLE 10 (1962). 
 45 R. HARRISON WAGNER, WAR AND THE STATE: THE THEORY OF 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 101 (2007). 
 46 Kenneth Waltz seems to have introduced this game to the study of 
international relations, drawing on a famous vignette by Jean-Jacques Rousseau. 
KENNETH N. WALTZ, MAN, THE STATE AND WAR: A THEORETICAl ANALYSIS 
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go into the woods in pursuit of the evening’s dinner. Their best 
outcome is to hunt a stag together, in which case they will feast on 
venison. However, either one of them can also choose to chase a rabbit 
on his own, in which case he will catch the rabbit and have a satisfying 
but meager meal, while the other huntsman (if he still pursues the stag) 
will go hungry. This game is summarized in the table below. 
    




Stag 3,3 0,1 
Rabbit 1,0 1,1 
 
The first insight of game theory, strategic interdependence, 
highlights how one hunter’s decision hinges on what he expects the 
other hunter will do. It further guarantees that there are only two 
possible outcomes: either both hunt the stag, or both hunt rabbits. 
Anything else is not stable—not an “equilibrium,” in the parlance of 
game theory—because at least one hunter would prefer to change his 
behavior to achieve a better outcome.47 For instance, if Hunter 1 
chased a rabbit, but Hunter 2 chased the stag, then Hunter 2 would 
deviate to chasing rabbits. Thus, strategic interdependence helps 
eliminate a variety of outcomes as implausible because reasonable 
agents would not behave in such a way, at least not for any sustained 
period of time.48 
                                                 
(1954); For an important recent application of this game to state formation, see BRIAN 
SKYRMS, THE STAG HUNT AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE (2004). 
 
 47 A third, mixed-strategy equilibrium exists, in which each hunter pursues 
the stag or the rabbit probabilistically. For ease of exposition, I ignore this possibility 
here. 
 48 Thus, game theory refuses the postmodern or constructivist idea that the 
world can be whatever “states make of it.” ALEXANDER WENDT, SOCIAL THEORY 
OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1999). 
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The second fundamental insight, multiple equilibria, stresses 
that, once implausible outcomes are eliminated, there remain many 
ways for the world to turn out. The Stag Hunt, though a simple game, 
has many possible outcomes. This multiplicity confronts both the 
theorist and the practitioner with a problem. Because the theorist seeks 
to predict outcomes, he must find ways to refine the number of 
possible equilibria; otherwise, he can offer no clear hypotheses to test. 
The theorist therefore turns to cultural norms and expectations in 
order to discern which outcomes are likely to occur in his own 
circumstances. To return to the Stag Hunt: if there are two possible 
equilibria, either both hunting the stag or both chasing rabbits, then 
the theorist must discern whether his society is one in which the 
hunters trust each other enough to hunt the stag. The practitioner faces 
a similar problem: because she likely finds herself in an unsatisfying 
equilibrium, she must devise ways to move from a less-desirable 
outcome to a more-desirable one. To put all this more simply, the 
problem of multiple equilibria is identical to the classic questions, 
“which of the possible worlds do we inhabit, which do we wish to 
inhabit, and how can we move from one to the other?” Game theory 
does not erase these idealistic questions; its importance is in stressing 
that imagination and idealism must be framed within the incentive 
structures of the relevant agents. 
In the Stag Hunt, the problem of multiple equilibria is easily 
solved. Even if the two hunters are used to chasing rabbits, they can 
coordinate with relative ease to start hunting stags. But imagine a far 
more complex hunt, with thousands of hunters, hundreds of options, 
and uncountably many competing interests. How could human beings 
navigate this complexity? The answer is surprisingly simple: they look 
for a focal point. 
C. Focal Points as a Solution to Multiple Equilibria 
Thomas Schelling was among the first to think seriously about 
the problem of multiple equilibria. He addressed it with a novel 
solution: the idea of a focal point.49 A focal point is an outcome which 
                                                 
 49 Thomas C. Schelling, Bargaining, Communication, and Limited War, 1 
CONFLICT RESOL. 19, 21 (1957). 
2020              Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs Symposium Issue 
18 
“stands out,” which attracts the actors’ attention, and by so doing 
makes coordination easier. Schelling popularized this idea with an 
intuitive example. Imagine two strangers: each is given a photograph 
of the other and told to meet that person at noon in New York City. 
They have no other information. Can they do it? Schelling’s surprising 
answer was, yes: both will probably go to Grand Central Station, or 
maybe Times Square.50 These hubs are focal points: popularized by 
movies, books, and television, they stand out in the public imagination 
as spots unlike the others. 
Other examples could include avoiding bicycle collisions by 
intuitively swerving right51or (if they have droll senses of humor) a 
husband and wife, separated in a department store, looking for each 
other at the lost-and-found. In these examples, thousands of possible 
equilibria exist. Cooperation emerges because both actors intuit a 
pattern of behavior that, for reasons either inherent or cultural, stands 
out from all the others—even though others could be perfectly 
“rational” or “reasonable.” 
The use of focal points is particularly important with tacit 
bargaining, where much must go unsaid. Tacit bargaining happens on 
a vast scale, as among millions of citizens who cannot possibly all talk 
to each other, and on a small scale, as among world leaders who cannot 
say or communicate everything they might wish. Drivers negotiating a 
poorly marked intersection are engaging in tacit bargaining (especially 
if one is more aggressive than the other); world leaders maneuvering 
carrier groups into a strategic waterway are doing the same thing. 
Indeed, an emerging consensus in political science sees state 
development as a kind of massive, unspoken bargain between rulers 
and ruled.52 In these situations, because it is impossible to explicitly 
coordinate action, the implicit appeal of focal points becomes 
decisively important. 
                                                 
 50 Id. 
 51 PRESH TALWALKAR, THE JOY OF GAME THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 
TO STRATEGIC THINKING 26-8 (2014). 
 52 Wagner, supra note 46; Charles Tilley, Coercion, Capital, and European States, 
AD 990-1990 in COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE, CONTENTIOUS POLITICS, AND SOCIAL 
CHANGE 140-54 (2017). 
Lessons From Game Theory About Humanizing Next-Generation Weapons 
19 
Since Schelling, the study of focal points has progressed, 
though not primarily within game theory.53 (He once observed, “Focal 
points have done more for the theory of games, than game theory has 
done for the theory of focal points.”)54 Instead, the concept opened an 
avenue for normative and sociological approaches to intersect rational, 
economic thinking:55 “here ideas contribute to outcomes in the absence 
of a unique equilibrium.”56 By studying which ideas gain salience, a 
social scientist can distinguish between multiple equilibria. This 
continued a research agenda Schelling envisioned, one in which game 
theory would illuminate which social conventions can (and cannot) 
come about and how durable they might be once they emerged.57 
D. Focal Points as Re-Humanizing 
The practice of identifying focal points is empathetic and 
deeply humane. It requires an observer to put himself, not just in 
someone else’s rational position, but in their emotional, cultural, and 
religious shoes, as well. He must get inside their heads and their hearts. 
Identifying focal points is an exercise of moral imagination. 
Unlike a rationalistic approach that would try to trace 
everything to first principles, moral imagination begins by situating 
oneself in particular cultural and historical circumstances. (The phrase 
“moral imagination” is due to Edmund Burke, who was arguing against 
the excessive rationalism of the French Revolution.)58 In this, it 
                                                 
 53 For an exception, see the work of Robert Sugden, who studies focal points 
rigorously within mathematical game theory. Robert Sugden, A Theory of Focal Points, 
105 THE ECON. J. 533, 533-50 (1995). 
 54 Jean-Paul Carvalho, An Interview with Thomas Schelling, 2 OXONOMICS 1,4 
(2007). 
 55 Albert S. Yee, Thick Rationality and the Missing Brute Fact: The Limits of 
Rationalist Incorporations of Norms and Ideas, 59 THE J. OF POL. 1001, 1001-39 (1997). 
 56 IDEAS AND FOREIGN POLICY: BELIEFS, INSTITUTIONS, AND POLITICAL 
CHANGE 12 (Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane eds., 1993). 
 57 In fact, Schelling believed that David Lewis, the eminent philosopher of 
conventions, took his main idea from Schelling’s course on bargaining, where Lewis 
had been his student. N. Emrah Aydinonat, An Interview with Thomas C. Schelling: 
Interpretation of Game Theory and the Checkerboard Model, 2 ECON. BULL. 1, 3 (2005). 
 58 ”By this ‘moral imagination,’ Burke signifies that power of ethical 
perception which strides beyond the barriers of private experience and momentary 
events.” RUSSELL KIRK, REDEEMING THE TIME 71 (1996). 
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resembles the moral philosophy of Adam Smith and his modern heirs, 
who emphasize a kind of empathy as requisite to just reasoning.59 Thus, 
through focal points, strategic reasoning not only involves but comes 
to demand a moral vision, one shared with other human beings. 
Schelling himself emphasized the role of ethical imagination. 
Finding a focal point, he argued, may “depend on imagination more 
than on logic; it may depend on analogy, precedent, accidental 
arrangement, symmetry, aesthetic or geometric configuration . . . Poets 
may do better than logicians at this game.”60 In fact, Schelling valued 
the role of imaginative boundaries so highly that he favored them even 
when they might cut against short-term bargaining power.61 Because 
states and culture are themselves a kind of “tacit bargain,” the ethical 
norms that evolve in them encapsulate how individuals are 
coordinating between multiple equilibria.62 
Through this evolutionary process of moral coordination 
around a focal point, nuclear weapons became re-humanized. That is, 
not the technology nor its deployment, but the imaginative ways the 
larger culture came to conceive it, restored a degree of humanity to 
nuclear strategy. So complete has this ethical evolution been, that some 
scholars argue the memory of Hiroshima has been “sanctified” in the 
public imagination.63 This process is most clearly seen in the nuclear 
taboo. 
                                                 
 59 ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS (D.D. Raphael and 
A.L. Macfie eds. 1976). It is worth noting that Smith is tracking a divide between 
reason and sentiment and inquiring which one offers the wellspring of moral judgment. 
“For Smith, the key mechanism of sympathy is imaginatively placing oneself in 
another’s position, or what would now be called simulation.” Antti Kauppinen, 
MORAL SENTIMENTALISM, IN THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 1 
(Edward Zalta ed. 2018). 
 60 Thomas C. Schelling, War Without Pain, and Other Models, 15 WORLD POL. 
465 (1963). 
 61 Alexander Field, Schelling, von Neumann, and the Event that Didn’t Occur, 5 
GAMES 53, 70 (2014). 
 62 Thomas C. Schelling, Game Theory and the Study of Ethical Systems, 12 J. OF 
CONFLICT RESOL. 34, 34-44 (1968). 
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The nuclear taboo is the international norm against the use of 
any nuclear weapon for any purpose. The taboo draws a distinction 
between nuclear and other weapons, and its prohibition on the former 
is total. How it arose through an interplay of strategic thought and 
moral imagination is well summarized by Nina Tannenwald: 
Game theorists hold that norms can serve as focal 
points, thus contributing to stable outcomes in the 
absence of a unique equilibrium. The analysis here 
helps to explain why one equilibrium was chosen over 
another. The development of the taboo has been the 
result of both self-interested and normative concerns, 
and has depended importantly on discursive 
strategies—–how nuclear weapons became 
categorized, interpreted, and politicized.64 
We take for granted that nuclear weapons and conventional 
weapons are qualitatively different from each other. Yet this distinction 
is arbitrary: “the line between conventional and nuclear weapons did 
not always exist but had to be created.”65 After all, today some nuclear 
weapons are less powerful than some conventional ones, and yet while 
the United States has periodically used the latter, it has never again 
used the former—despite strong temptation otherwise.66 Moreover, 
the taboo is not a matter of law, since the use of nuclear weapons is not 
legally prohibited.67 Furthermore, the distinction certainly was not 
inevitable: many early Cold Warriors, including Secretary Dulles, 
expected they would eventually by treated as ordinary weapons not 
unlike any others.68 
                                                 
 64 Nina Tannenwald, Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the Nuclear Taboo, 29 
INT’L SECURITY 5, 41 (2005). 
 65 Id. at 12. 
 66 Thomas C. Schelling, An Astonishing Sixty Years: The Legal of Hiroshima, 96 
AM. ECON. REV. 929, 931-2 (2006). 
 67 The United States has never agreed to any general prohibition, and in fact 
has vetoed such proposals. See also Michael N. Schmitt, The International Court of Justice 
and the Use of Nuclear Weapons, 51 NAVAL WAR C. REV. 91, 91-116 (1998); Dale 
Stephens, Human Rights and Armed Conflict: The Advisory Opinion of the International Court 
of Justice in the Nuclear Weapons Case, 4 YALE HUM. RTS. AND DEV. L. J. 1, 1 (2001). 
 68 Tannenwald, supra note 65, at 5. 
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It seems clear that, without this artificial convention, nuclear 
weapons likely would have been used sometime in the past sixty 
years.69 Yet, “[a]lthough rationalist variables are important, the taboo 
cannot be explained simply as the straightforward result of rational 
adaptation to strategic circumstances.”70 Instead, it emerged through a 
normative evolution propagated by activists, novelists, and public 
discourse. This evolution exerted increasing pressure on policymakers, 
constraining them within the moral dimensions in which the public 
saw nuclear force.71 In fact, many advances in military technology were 
explicitly passed over by policymakers, for fear of eroding the 
distinction between nuclear and other weapons. (Similarly, PNEs—
peaceful nuclear explosions, whose use was proposed for large-scale 
construction projects like canals—also became taboo.)72 
Thomas Schelling dedicated his Nobel acceptance speech to 
this theme. He said: 
A large part of the credit for nuclear weapons not 
having been used must be due to the “taboo” that 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles perceived to have 
been attached to these weapons as early as 1953 . . . 
These weapons are unique, and a large part of their 
uniqueness derives from their being perceived as unique. 
We call most other weapons “conventional,” and that 
word has two distinct senses. One is “ordinary, 
familiar, traditional,” words that can be applied to 
food, clothing, or housing. The more interesting sense 
of “conventional” is something that arises as if by 
compact, by agreement, by convention. It is simply an 
established convention that nuclear weapons are 
different.73 
                                                 
 
 69 Nina Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative 
Basis of Nuclear Non-Use, 53 Int’l Org. 433, 463 (1999). 
 70 Tannenwald, supra note 65, at 7. 
 71 Id. at 23-7. 
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It is striking that Schelling, a game theorist and an economist, 
privileges an imaginative convention over rule-making, 
institutionalization, or regulation: 
We depend on nonproliferation efforts to restrain the 
production and deployment of weapons by more and 
more countries; we may depend even more on 
universally shared inhibitions on nuclear use. 
Preserving those inhibitions and extending them, if we 
know how to preserve and extend them, to cultures 
and national interests that may not currently share 
those inhibitions will be a crucial part of our nuclear 
policy.74 
In short, nuclear weapons became rehumanized through a 
normative evolution outside of nuclear strategy. This evolution did not 
overwhelm strategic incentives—the campaign for nuclear abolition 
never came close to succeeding, and the United States never adopted 
a no-first-use policy—but it channeled these strategic decisions within 
a moral vision of the world. As a result, international cooperation 
emerged within a deeply satisfying ethical framework despite the 
fundamentally dehumanizing nature of nuclear weapons, a nature 
which to this day remains basically unchanged. 
III. FOCAL POINTS, IMAGINATIVE COOPERATION, AND 
AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS 
If we take the nuclear taboo as a guide, to develop international 
norms around autonomous systems, we should take their 
dehumanizing aspects as given, and instead seek to rehumanize nuclear 
strategy through the popular imagination. This prescription is not far 
from that suggested by Sir John Keegan’s seminal The Face of Battle. 
There, he stresses the value of a “de-sensitized,” even a 
“dehumanizing,” approach to war, one which has helped make 
Western militaries the most powerful in the world: “the deliberate 
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injection of emotion into an already highly emotive subject will 
seriously hinder, if not indeed altogether defeat, the aim of officer-
training . . . [given] that battles are going to happen, it is powerfully 
beneficial.”75 Dehumanization is a necessary part of military power. But 
Keegan goes on to outline an important role for the military historian, 
which is to recapture the ‘realism’ of battle by imbuing its necessarily 
abstract components with something of their original life; to re-
humanize it: hence his title, the face of battle.76 
What Keegan did for battle, John Hersey’s Hiroshima did for 
nuclear weapons.77 His son relates: “He told me about getting the idea 
of using novelistic devices to structure his reporting. He wanted to put 
faces and names to the story . . . He wanted to show their humanity.”78 
His approach sets a valuable precedent to follow. If we want to 
understand how to talk and write about the effects of autonomous 
weapons, his example is a good place to begin.79 
A. Examples of Focal Points in International Law 
One of the most important facts about the nuclear taboo is 
that it is entirely arbitrary. The distinction upon which it rests does not 
actually have a basis in any first principles or pure reason. Rather, it is 
entirely the result of an ethical evolution. Its moral force, which is 
entirely real, flows from norms that are not inherent but have been 
                                                 
 75 Keegan, supra note 25, at 18-21. 
 76 In one instructive comparison, he contrasts the historiography of Julius 
Caesar, whose “subordinate figures are cardboard,” with that of Thucydides, whose 
figures “are individuals, with wills of their own . . . 
Thucydides’ army . . . [is] the product of human conduct and character at every level.” 
Id. at 68. 
 77 JOHN HERSEY, HIROSHIMA (1999). 
 78 Russell Shorto, John Hersey, the Writer Who Let Hiroshima Speak for Itself, 
THE NEW YORKER (Aug. 31, 2016), 
https://www.newyorker.com/culture/culture-desk/john-hersey-the-writer-who-
let-hiroshima-speak-for-itself. 
 79 Some scholarly efforts have recently been exerted in this direction, 
especially by scholars from the liberal arts, but their ponderous execution and 
academese have limited their appeal. FROM ABOVE: WAR, VIOLENCE, AND 
VERTICALITY (Mark Whitehead, Peter Adey, and Alison Williams eds. 2013). Charles 
J. Dunlap, Jr., Book Review: From Above: War, Violence, and Verticality, 44 PARAMETERS 
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created. Early in the Cold War, Schelling and Hedley Bull converged 
toward the idea that “‘a common language, a common epistemology 
and understanding of the universe, a common religion, a common 
ethical code” is necessary for stable cooperation; they differed in that 
Schelling believed “norms were much more created than made.”80 
Schelling turned out to be right. Before returning to autonomous 
systems, it will be useful to briefly consider two other examples where 
focal points emerged through the efforts of normative entrepreneurs 
to shape international law: the campaign to save the whales, and the 
regulation of outer space. 
Similar to the nuclear taboo is the legal moratorium on 
whaling. The modern norm against whaling is novel; in fact, even in 
the 1960s U.S. pilots still used whales for target practice.81 While their 
killing was regulated by international bodies, it was seen as an entirely 
legitimate practice. Just as nuclear weapons once were considered just 
another kind of bomb, so too were whales just another kind of marine 
life. During the 1960s and 70s, increasing disagreement about the 
proper bounds on whaling made cooperation difficult. 
Environmentalists exploited this fissure to create a new focal point for 
international norms: zero whaling. The clarity of this idea made it easy 
to coordinate the relevant actors, while their opponents could never 
create a similarly imaginative focus.82 Once these actors came to 
dominate the International Whaling Commission, international law 
swiftly followed suit. “They [environmentalists] mobilize for political 
action best when an issue can be framed in fairly simple terms 
indicating a clear policy preference without the need for a highly 
detailed explanation of why the chosen policy is better than others.”83 
The moratorium has been in force ever since. 
                                                 
 80 Robert Ayson, A Common Interest in Common Interest: Hedley Bull, Thomas 
Schelling, and Collaboration in International Politics, in REMEMBERING HEDLEY 56, 61 
(Coral Bell and Meredith Thatcher eds. 2008). 
 81 Mark J. Peterson, Whalers, Cetologists, Environmentalists, and the International 
Management of Whaling, 46 INT’L ORG. 147, 159 n. 23 (1992). 
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Perhaps the best example of creating a new focal point is outer 
space. Americans take it for granted that space is a sort of commons, 
something belonging to all humanity, but this was not obvious when 
its exploration first became possible. There were multiple equilibria. 
Two of these potential equilibria came to stand out: in one, space 
would be treated like airspace, a kind of property divided among 
sovereign nations; in the other, it would be treated like the high seas, 
navigable to all. Western lawyers, eager for an internationalist vision of 
the next frontier, began advancing the analogy of the high seas, and 
this became the foundation of international law on the matter.84 To be 
sure, there were traditional balance-of-power concerns in the 
negotiations; but the legal norms that emerged were essentially 
determined by imaginative metaphors, not power politics. We owe the 
freedom of space, now a cornerstone of the global economy, to the 
imaginative analogies drawn in the early years of the Cold War.85 
B. Creating Focal Points for Autonomous Systems 
The major obstacle to cooperation around autonomous 
systems is the absence of a clear focal point. At present, no 
coordination point stands out besides non-use, and unlike with nuclear 
weapons or whaling this outcome is not an equilibrium. The problem 
is especially pressing, since action needs to be taken before suboptimal 
patterns evolve on their own.86The pressure is especially acute for the 
United States, who “sets the standard for bombing practices and 
remains the focus of efforts to change those practices.”87 The 
technology itself, though, is not the problem, but its dehumanizing 
effects.88 As with nuclear weapons, we should look for their solution, 
not in the technology, but in the way our culture morally imagines it. 
                                                 
 84 To settle disputes over celestial objects and property rights, this analogy 
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In this section, I want to draw three lessons from the previous 
discussion of nuclear strategy: begin with incentives; keep it simple; 
and start at the top. 
1. Begin with Incentives 
Cooperation must begin by identifying potential equilibria—
or, put another way, it must begin by studying the relevant incentives. 
Once again, it is useful to turn to Thomas Schelling: 
As a starting point for legal analysis or moral judgment, 
it may be helpful to draw the matrix of choices . . . 
Game theory would be most pertinent to those 
constraints that affect people’s expectations about each 
other . . . And in that process, the difference between 
ethics and law, or ethics and instinct, may be less 
important than the similarities.89 
Imagination is not an excuse to escape reality. Rather, 
imagination must begin with what is probable.90 The simplest proposal 
for dealing with autonomous weapons is to abolish them or, at the 
least, to ban their use.91 This proposal will not succeed. Immediately, 
the enormous pressures on democratic leaders to avoid casualties 
mean that nonuse92 or abolition is not an option.93 Public support for 
drone strikes is strong and, by some polls, overwhelming, especially 
when American lives are not at risk; moreover, this support is 
                                                 
 89 Schelling, supra note 63, at 35-6. 
 90 Here, my argument tracks that of the philosopher Irving Babbitt. Babbitt 
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bipartisan.94 So long as capital-rich democracies prefer to lose 
expensive machines rather than people—a preference that seems 
universal and enduring—autonomous systems will be a fact of modern 
war.95 
Moreover, given their increasing accuracy and precision, many 
observers argue that armed forces have a responsibility to use these new 
technologies, especially unmanned vehicles.96 In fact, some legal 
scholars argue that international law ought to make their use a positive 
duty.97 Far from abolishing them, autonomous systems may be ethically 
required of 21st century war. 
Another common proposal is Meaningful Human Control 
(MHC).98 Unlike abolition, this proposal does not seek to eliminate the 
technology but to circumvent the legal and moral dilemmas it poses. It 
would require human beings to make the most ethically and legally-
fraught decisions, taking these responsibilities away from “killer 
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robots.”99 Though a proposal still in its infancy,100 there are reasons to 
be skeptical of its viability or staying power. The rapidity with which a 
decision must be made as the technology advances will make effective 
human control impossible. In fact, even so minimal a requirement as 
“eyes on target” will become not only strategically but morally 
untenable, as it will make collateral deaths more likely.101 Finally, the 
relative ease with which nonstate actors can acquire the technology 
means that state actors will struggle to limit their own use of such 
instruments. 
   Simply put, these proposals are not equilibria. Actors face too many 
pressures to deviate, to cheat, and to change the rules. Keith Abney 
observes, “given ‘ought implies can,’ tactical and technical changes [in 
warfare have] . . . led to changes in just war theory.”102 We should 
recognize that international law will not succeed in prohibiting this 
technology, and such efforts may prove very damaging along the 
way.103 The technology will progress; we must use our imaginations so 
that our laws and norms keep pace.104 
2. Keep it Simple 
When debating the ethics of drones, there is a tendency among 
policymakers and especially among scholars to move too quickly into 
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the weeds. For instance, Rosa Brooks, a law professor at Georgetown, 
in testifying to Congress, moved quickly from “encourag[ing] 
transparency” to forming “a non-partisan blue ribbon commission” 
and concluding with “creating a [new] judicial mechanism, perhaps 
similar to the existing Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court . . . ”105 
It is perhaps unfair to criticize a lawyer in front of Congress for 
focusing on legal remedies; but her testimony typifies a common 
response. Often, discussion turns to debating legal and moral 
intricacies accessible only to a highly educated audience.106 This 
contrasts strikingly with the development of the nuclear taboo, which 
began by drawing a distinction comprehensible to the ordinary man; 
with the campaign to save the whales; and even with the imagination 
of space as a commons rather than as private property. All of these, 
while eventually highly technical and recondite, began with simple 
ideas and simple illustrations. These ideas then informed the 
imaginations of the publics and politicians whose beliefs would 
structure subsequent cooperation. 
Samuel Taylor Coleridge, the English Romantic, famously 
compared imagination to a kind of healthy mania. This mania relates 
everything to a central, organizing passion. He observed: “He that 
knows the state of the human mind in deep passion must know, that 
it approaches to that condition of madness, which is not absolute 
frenzy or delirium, but which models all things to one reigning idea”107 
Thomas Schelling’s work followed just this pattern: “extract the central 
lessons (in this case from international strategy), capture them in 
simple formulations, and describe them in language that is both lucid 
and vivid.”108 He became the greatest of the nuclear strategists because 
he understood the need to order complex phenomena around a simple 
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center: “If you’re going to do theory and develop concepts that you 
hope will help people have a deeper sense of the structure of some part 
of the world, then give them concepts they can use easily.”109 Like his 
books, his lectures at Harvard were celebrated for their illuminating 
analogies, like comparing nuclear blackmail to child-rearing. Almost 
alone among the defense intellectuals, Schelling was and remains 
inescapable: “it is difficult to recall how the world looked before we 
first saw it with the aid of Thomas Schelling’s vision.”110 We should 
strive for the same clarity of insight. The time for details and minutiae 
will come, but not until after the overarching ideas are in place. A focal 
point, to facilitate cooperation, must stand out, and prominence 
demands a kind of simplicity—a simplicity whose essence can be 
quickly grasped, no matter how complex its details. 
3. Start at the Top 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, later the Director of Policy Planning 
under Secretary Clinton, outlined in a 1997 Foreign Affairs article a 
vision of “the real new world order.”111 In this vision, most 
international cooperation occurs, not between heads of government, 
but within transnational networks of bureaucrats, judges, regulators, 
etc, and their counterparts abroad. For instance, “[j]udges are building 
a global community of law,” she says, such as the Organization of the 
Supreme Courts of the Americas.112 These networks bypass traditional 
actors and treaty-making, focusing on extending cooperation at 
alternative levels of the state. A similar argument is made by legal 
scholars studying “global administrative law.”113 They emphasize the 
progress of international legal cooperation among networks of low-
level actors and organizations, especially when inter-state cooperation 
is ineffective or slow-moving, or when existing treaties are inadequate 
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to the problems at hand.114 This transnationalism comes to resemble a 
new kind of constitutional regime in international law,115 and it is 
unsurprising that it presents certain challenges to the norm of 
sovereignty.116 
Whether or not Slaughter correctly describes the emerging 
“new world order,” it would be a mistake to begin with such midlevel 
actors. The proliferation of low-tech drone technology117—which 
scholarship on legal cooperation often ignores118—makes coordination 
among the relevant actors daunting. These technologies 
disproportionately benefit nonstate actors, especially terrorist groups, 
and their usage will disrupt efforts at regulation by transnational 
bureaucrats. Coordination would be better advised to begin at the 
highest levels, where autonomous technologies are out of reach of all 
but a few state actors. 
Besides technological proliferation, there is a still more 
important reason to begin with the big issues. The nuclear taboo was 
created and sustained, not by transnational cooperation, but by the 
moral imaginations of domestic and international publics. A 
transnational approach would not appreciate “the importance of 
democratizing domestic policymaking on nuclear weapons . . . 
[including] civilian nuclear analysts and arms control groups, and other 
groups in civil society, as well as public education about nuclear 
weapons.”119 Whatever norms ultimately guide the use of autonomous 
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systems, they must be ingrained in the popular consciousness before 
they can constrain international actors. Bypassing the people will not 
create a sustainable norm. 
In the same way that the shaping of the public’s moral 
imagination around a nuclear taboo was more important than the NPT 
or arms control treaties, so too constraining autonomous systems will 
depend on shaping the public imagination. Successfully confining 
drones and “killer robots” will depend on the form these technologies 
take in the public imagination. A better approach is that of normative 
entrepreneurship. An extensive literature traces how entrepreneurial 
actors construct normative frame.120 These figures focus on public 
argumentation in order to frame elite-public discourse, which then 
determines what sort of cooperation occurs.121 The insight of this 
constructivist scholarship, in contrast to that of more institutionalist 
approaches, is the need to create a social idea before mobilizing 
institutional bodies. If there is no shared conception, there cannot be 
a focal point of cooperation. Transnationalism, while perhaps an 
appropriate tool down the road, must proceed from, and not precede, 
the creation of a common moral axis around which the details of future 
cooperation can revolve. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
To some extent, the dehumanizing influence of autonomous 
systems cannot be escaped, but that does not mean it cannot be 
counteracted. Nuclear weapons were far more dehumanizing than 
drones or killer robots will ever be, and their inhumanity was 
overcome. Their dehumanization was overcome by creating a focal 
point that could stand out in the popular moral imagination. In some 
ways, this point was arbitrary—in fact, there is no qualitative difference 
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between nuclear and other weapons—but its arbitrariness does not 
make it less ethically salient. 
We can draw manifold lessons from nuclear strategy in the 
moral imagination, but I briefly developed only three. I suggest the way 
forward should begin by analyzing the incentives of the relevant actors. 
Such an analysis requires us to look elsewhere than non-use or 
abolition. It should then proceed to imaginative construction of focal 
points around which cooperation might emerge. These foci will 
necessarily be simple: experts who move too quickly to minutiaea 
misunderstand the state of the problems we face. Finally, to construct 
these imaginative foci, I suggest normative entrepreneurs begin at the 
top and work their way down. By doing so, they will both bypass the 
thorniest areas of cooperation (where the multiplicity of actors will 
make coordination extremely difficult) and, more importantly, they will 
form the moral imaginations of the most important actors: the 
democratic publics and politicians who alone can sustain long-term 
cooperation. 
The dehumanizing effects of weapons like drones and nuclear 
warheads cannot be counteracted in the moment of their use, nor in 
adjustments to the technology itself, nor in the way strategy is 
formulated; rather, the weapons are humanized by the ways the larger 
culture comes to talk about them. So, here is the question facing the 
next generation of weaponry: can we draw clear moral distinctions that 
align with our incentives, focus our cooperation, and, by capturing our 
imaginations, re-humanize a dehumanizing technology? It is the same 
question that faced nuclear weapons in the early Cold War. Given our 
success then, we need not fear a little optimism now. 
